Part of that involves correcting some errors in the final reports, and part of it involves bringing you the tale of the 2002 WSOP's best innovation, the Bracelet Winner tournament. Because I've never been a fan of the theory that "the accusation goes on page one, and the retraction goes on page 22," I'll lead with a key hand I reported incorrectly in The Big One, move on to the Bracelet Tournament, and then share with you a special note written by one of the Championship Event final table participants.

Andy Glazer, Editor
Wednesday Nite Poker

For more information on this newsletter read "What to Expect from Wednesday Nite Poker".

Midway through my report on Day Five of the Championship Event, I wrote, attempting to make sense of some notes I had a hard time reading:

DID ROSENBLUM LOSE FOCUS?

A certain amount of this kind of behavior tends to prove coolness under fire, but for a guy who didn't have any big wins on his resume, suddenly turning into Devilfish Ulliott seemed dangerous. I whispered to Diego Cordovez that it looked like Rosenblum was enjoying himself (who wouldn't?) but that he seemed to have lost focus on the task at hand.

Nonetheless, Rosenblum was focused enough to know what to do when he found two aces in his hand on #118. He just moved straight in from the button, knowing that the overbet would look like an attempt to steal the blinds, and Gardner went for it, calling with Jd-6d. Gardner was in bad shape, but got about as big a flop as anyone could hope for short of a full house or quads: Js-8d-4d, and had gone from roughly a 4.5-1 underdog before the flop to about a 2% favorite on it.

Although the Qc didn't help Gardner's cause, he made his flush on the end, and Gardner, a tall, thin, pasty-looking Brit (a lack of sunshine and British food will do that to a lad, and no, please no emails about my hating England, because I'm an Anglophile to the core), pumped his fist to the sky in triumph. Gardner had swung from the brink of elimination in sixth place to nearly a million in chips and a real shot at the title.

* * *

AND NOW FOR SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT

Trying to put one of these reports late at night is sometimes challenging, and thanks to an inconsiderate phone call from someone who should have known better (no names, but you know who you are), the whole two hours of sleep I'd scheduled the day before the Big One's finale got cut in half.

The three paragraphs above don't make sense in any number of ways. First, why would Julian Gardner, a very strong player, call a huge bet with a rotten hand like Jc-6c? Second, why would I introduce a paragraph discussing a "loss of focus" I thought I had observed in Rosenblum, only to talk about a hand in which he had aces?

The reality is simple enough: somehow, late at night, I transposed the two players' hands, and then, staring at notes about incorrect hands, made some incorrect conclusions about what Rosenblum was trying to do with his two aces. My notes were right about who WON the hand, so the only conclusion I could come to was that Gardner had made a flush.

Instead, it was Rosenblum who raised with Jc-6c on the button, and Gardner who had the trivially simple call with his aces, but who then had to sweat out a very dangerous flop, where his opponent flopped both a pair and a flush draw. The odds I listed were right: pocket aces are roughly a 4.5-1 favorite over Jc-6c before the flop, but the flop is so strong for the Jc-6c (allowing its owner to win with any jack, six, or club) that Gardner became the temporary slight underdog. It turned out that Rosenblum never made a second pair or his flush, and Gardner had the chips that I had at least correctly placed in his stack.

Rosenblum made a very classy post to the RGP poker newsgroup about his final table performance, and gave me permission to reprint it here, so after we get to the story about the bracelet winners tournament, we'll see what Rosenblum had to say about his final table performance.

"Would We Be Drinking 7-Up, or Might Another 8-6 A Rival?"
by Andrew N.S Glazer

The World Series and Binion's Horseshoe came up with a number of innovations this year, and as with all new ideas, some were received better than others (the one way you can ensure you never make a mistake, as well as never invent anything good, is to never try to do anything). I was not enthusiastic about the gin and hearts events, but no doubt some people enjoyed them. One idea that went over very well was the Bracelet Winners Tournament, a one-on-one match play event that featured a $2,500 entry fee.

Anyone who had ever won a bracelet was eligible to compete, but it wasn't clear just how long that list was. Binion's distributed a list of everyone who had ever won a bracelet, a total of 301 names, but as soon as I saw Stu Ungar's name on the list, I knew the total number of eligible players was somewhere south of 300.

29 players chose to enter the no-limit hold'em event, in which participants received $2,500 each in tournament chips in round one, $5,000 each in round two, $10,000 each in round three, $20,000 each in round four, and $40,000 each in the finals, with the idea being to create longer, more skill-filled matches as the tournament moved on.

The tournament unfolded as follows:

Round One:
Men "the Master" Nguyen def. Mike Carson
Daniel Negreanu def. Scotty Nguyen
Erik Seidel received a bye (random draw)
Johnny Chan def. Amarillo Slim Preston
Diego Cordovez def. Humberto Brenes
Barry Shulman def. Berry Johnston
Mike Laing def. T.J. Cloutier
Mickey Appleman received a bye
Phil Hellmuth def. Mel Weiner
Jim Lester def. Allen Cunningham
Steve Zolotow def. David Pham
Billy Baxter def. Chris "Jesus" Ferguson
Tom McEvoy def. "Captain" Tom Franklin
Jennifer Harman received a bye
Dave "Devilfish" Ulliott def. "Syracuse" Chris Tsiprailidis
Phil Ivey def. Jim Bechtel

Round Two:
Negreanu def. Men "the Master" Nguyen
Chan def. Seidel (Rounders, part III?)
Cordovez def. Shulman
Laing def. Appleman
Hellmuth def. Lester
Zolotow def. Baxter
McEvoy def. Harman
Ivey def. Ulliott

Round Three:
Chan def. Negreanu
Cordovez def. Laing
Hellmuth def. Zolotow
McEvoy def. Ivey

Round Four (Semi-finals, losers guaranteed $8,575)
Chan def. Cordovez
Hellmuth def. McEvoy

And so here we were, déjà vu all over again. In 1989, Hellmuth defeated then two-time defending World Champion Chan to win his first and only World Championship, and to halt Chan's attempt to win a surely unbreakable record of three straight Championships.

Each player had different recollections of the time since. Hellmuth thought that he and Chan had met "two or three times" in lesser tournament finals during the intervening 13 years, while Chan was fairly sure that this was the first time a tournament had come down to the two of them, even though they had been at plenty of final table together.

The winner was to receive $34,000, and the loser $17,000, and while neither player was likely to throw his winner's share out into the street to watch passers-by scramble for it, far more was at stake here than the $17,000 difference.

WOULD IT BE SEVEN-UP, OR COULD HELLMUTH "86" CHAN?

Going into the match, Hellmuth held seven WSOP bracelets, and he's made no secret of his desire to overtake Doyle Brunson and his record eight. Chan held six bracelets. If Hellmuth won, he'd catch the aging Brunson and go two up on his contemporary, Chan, 8-6. If Chan won, he would not only exact a measure of revenge for the 1989 defeat (and Chan, who usually tries to remain "above" such matters, at least as far as the press is concerned, made no attempt to hide his feelings.

"I respect Phil," Chan said, "but this is definitely a revenge match for me. I want some payback for 1989. I would still rather have won in 1989, but that was then and this is now, and now is all I can do anything about."

As those who have read my tournament reports know, heads-up, the small blind goes on the button (SBB), and acts first before the flop but second after the flop. Owning the button provides a considerable advantage (that is of course equally shared, because button ownership switches every hand), because before the flop, the button's owner can apply pressure by making the first bet, when there isn't a lot of information available to the two players (only the two cards in their hands). The person holding the big blind must not only respond to that pressure, but must do so knowing that he or she will be out of position for the remainder of the hand, when there is much more information (i.e., the flop, turn, and river) available.

I mention these strategic concerns because Hellmuth employed a strategy I'd never before seen used heads up at the final of any tournament, or in any heads-up tournament. The blinds started at $100-$200 and were schedule to increase once per hour. The first seven times Hellmuth held the button, he called the $100 blind bet on the SBB in the dark. That is, before receiving any cards, he added a $100 chip to the forced small blind chip, forfeiting his right to raise if he liked his hand or to fold if he hated it, and leaving Chan with all the initiative.

On hand #15, Hellmuth decided to forego the dark bet strategy, for one hand only, and then returned to it, abandoning it only on hand #49…which turned out to be three hands before the match ended. Chan decided to try to turn the tables on this unorthodox strategy with an admitted attempt to "get into Phil's head with some comments."

The duo had done some talking already, but on #49, when Hellmuth abandoned the unorthodox strategy, Chan said "Oh, you got enough heart to look at your cards now?"

Hellmuth was trailing in he match by roughly a 2-1 chip count at this point, thanks mainly to one big hand on #42. On that one, Chan had opened for a raise to 7k from the SBB (Chan almost always raised his SBB in this match, and between those raises and the number of raises he put in from the big blind after Hellmuth had made his dark call, very clearly had claimed the aggressor's role in the match), and Hellmuth had called. The flop came Ad-Qd-7s, Hellmuth checked the FLOP in the dark, Chan bet $1,000, Hellmuth looked at his cards and made it $3,500, and Chan called.

The 3s hit the turn, Hellmuth bet out for $6,000, and Chan called. A second ace, the Ah, hit the river, and this time Hellmuth led out for $4,000. Chan took less than two seconds to call and flipped over his K-K. Hellmuth mucked his hand: he'd been "caught running without the ball, and despite Chan's role as initiator and aggressor, it really wasn't until this hand that Chan took any significant lead.

Getting back to the by-play and the comment about "having enough heart, Hellmuth respond. ""No, that's not it, Johnny, I've been fighting you with my left hand, and you didn't remember I was a right-hander (I have a feeling Phil has watched or read The Princess Bride fairly recently: there's a great sword fight scene involving a similar line). I think I need both hands to fight against you."

It had been a respectful enough comeback line, and Chan acknowledged it with a laugh. "You need both hands against me, OK, I can live with that," Chan said.

Three hands later, Hellmuth held the SBB and didn't make a dark call: he raised to $700, only to see Chan re-raise him to $2,200; Hellmuth called. The flop came Kh-Jd-9c. Chan immediately bet out for $2,500, a bet that hardly could have seemed suspicious, given all the aggression Chan had shown throughout the match, and Hellmuth raised him to $8,500. Chan moved all-in, and Hellmuth called. The hands would have been impressive enough in a ring game: heads-up, they were remarkable.

Chan held pocket kings, and had flopped top set. Hellmuth held J-9, and had flopped two pair. Reverse the hands, and all the money is going in either way: these hands are just way too strong for anything else to happen in no-limit. The only difference with a hand reversal is that Chan would still have had chips, because he had the lead. But there was no reversal, and the match was over, strangely enough without the final two cards being dealt because someone said "it's over" when at least technically it wasn't. Hellmuth could have won had the turn and river cards both been jacks or nines; either one of those 989-1 results would have given him quads. Just one jack or one nine (or one of each) wouldn't have helped, because Chan would have had the larger full house.

In the aftermath, I asked Hellmuth about the unorthodox dark call approach, although I waited a while, because this hand was such a cooler (poker slang for a bad beat that derives from "bringing in a cold deck," although Hellmuth made no such accusations) that I figured I had better give him a while to recover.

"I had a definite plan, although with those two big hands it didn't work," Hellmuth said. "I limped in (made the dark calls) because I didn't want to be looking at my cards. He's so aggressive that I wanted to be able to focus entirely on looking into his eyes when he looked at his cards, for the hands when I'd have position later."

Just because a play is unorthodox doesn't mean it's wrong, especially when someone who reads people as well as Hellmuth employs it, but even putting the two big hands aside, most of the expert onlookers I consulted about the match felt that Chan had outplayed Hellmuth from the start, both with the cards and in the battle of words. I'm too biased for an objective opinion, so I'll report the unanimity of the respected onlookers, and the result.

It might have taken seven years to drink it, but I doubt a seven-up ever tasted quite so sweet.

AND NOW, FOR SOMETHING REALLY REALLY DIFFERENT…

Russell Rosenblum, the attorney who finished sixth in the main event, made a VERY classy post to the RGP newsgroup, and I found it so interesting that I asked him for permission to reprint it here in WNP. He agreed, and so here you have an insider's perspective on what it's like to sit at that Mecca of final tables"

Date: 5/26/02 3:24 PM Pacific Daylight Time

Some people have told me not to bother responding to comments on the final table play. I feel I owe it to the group as I named this group as one of my poker mentors in the interview for whichever network is going to air this.

First of all, I want to thank everyone on RGP for his and/or her support. I particularly want to thank MM (in case his boss is reading) and Bruce Kramer and Ken Adams, who were crazy enough to fly out to sweat my final table.

Next I want to say, I played a LOUSY final table. I have given this a lot of thought (no surprise). The J-6 was not the problem, the problem was the 4 hours leading up to the J-6. I failed to adequately change gears at this table.

I had played with everyone at this table for at LEAST 6 hours except for Harley. There had been a consistent pattern of having Julian, Scott, and Ralph come over top of my raises for 2 days (3 days for Scott). Rob is very tough, because he simply pushes all in.

The only thing that I had to go on was that none of these players had ever called my all-in raises, or even my reraises (except for Julian with AK against my JJ at the end of Day Four, and Julian at the beginning of Day Four with his 66 to my JJ).

For those who know me and have played with me, a big part of my game is my talking. The problem was for the first few rounds I could not get anyone to budge. It was like playing in a morgue.

The error I made was not realizing that the players that had come over top of me on days Three and Four were playing WAY to tight to come over top of me on Day Five. If I had properly changed gears to reflect this I would have been able to simply make 3-4x bb raises to steal blinds. Remember on days Two-Four when I tried this 3 of 4 times I would get re-raised and have to muck.

So on days Two-Four I had to be more "creative" to find chips. It should also be noted that I showed down an average of three hands a day between days 1-Four. AK, AQ (when Julian had AK), JJ (when Julian had AK), KK (against AK), a set of 66 (on Day 1), and 10-5 when the 5 made a wheel and I got a free ride in the BB. I had an EXTREMLY tight image going into Day Five.

My goal was to not play for an hour or so to reinforce that image, and then revert to stealing when we lost a few players. The problem was that everyone was SO TIGHT that I could, and should have opened up my game early. I finally opened up my game against the eventual winner, and he took 250K of my chips when he had AA in the BB and I made a raise UTG with AQ (I told people it was AK but now realize you will all see it on TV in a few months.). He check raised all-in on a flop of J-J-X.

Now to the J-6 hand. Obviously I did not want to get called. That said, on Day Four Julian re raised a good 3/4 of my steal raises. He almost never called an all in raise by me. I had come over top of him with some bizarre hands. Leading up to this hand, I finally had the
table a bit looser and talking. I had said to Scott that the blinds were now big enough to make this a crap shoot, and he agreed. My play started things getting a bit wacky. This is how I like it.

My goal was to "appear" wacky, and then shut down for a couple of rounds (absent cards). I believed (and still do) that this would enable a couple of players to go bust, move me up, and give me a reasonable chance to get into a 3 way position where Rob had already indicated that he would talk about a deal.

I was fairly confident that Julian only calls with AA, KK AK, and MAYBE QQ. Remember for 2 days AQ is the WORST hand he has seen me play. I wanted to pick up 85k in dead money. Could I have raised 75K and folded to a big re-raise? Of course. But this was the problem: on Day Four he made me fold so often my head spun. So I stopped stealing his blinds without a hand that I would be willing to re-reraise with.

The key here was to take him and Scott out of their game. Ralph appeared unshakable. This was my analysis at the time. In hindsight my analysis was completely wrong. Julian was already way off of his game, as was Scott. They were far tighter than in the past and simply trying to find a strategy. Ralph was trying to take control of the table, but when he got re raised on three of six steal attempts by Rob, John Shipley and me, he shut down.

I had the best seat at this table, and had I realized that the most aggressive players had shut down, I would have changed gears and opened up. In that event the J-6 would not have been necessary. This was my great failure.

For those who still say why J-6? You go with what got you there. I had made this play for 3 days with similar hands against players with similar reads on me. I had just not had the misfortune to run into a hand this big yet.

My plan was to shut down after this move. I still think the probability of success was extremely high (maybe 50-1). But again, if I change gears sooner it is completely unnecessary.

WHY ROBERT WON

Robert was the ONLY person at this table--either by skill or by chance--who actually opened up his game when everybody else shut down. Simply put, he was the only aggressor, and as such deserved to win.

Why Shipley called with AJ: Simply put, he cracked. He had a tell on Rob (sorry Rob if you read this or if it is forwarded to you). Rob was clearly not happy that his all in with JJ was about to get called. Shipley took the sign of weakness as the opportunity to call. What he failed to realize was that he held AJ and could beat nothing.

Why I mucked my JJ on Day Four: I cracked. There's no other way to put it, but first, let me give you the background.

I played the best poker of my life, by FAR, on Day Qne. I ended with 30K in chips, having shown down only 2 hands all day. And never having won a pot larger than 4K. I was about 50th in chips (of 370 or so) going into Day Two.

On Day Two I got a terrible table draw. I had 3 bigger stacks than me to my left. I then proceeded to get my AA cracked in about 35 minutes and was back down to 17K. I was shaken. I shook it off and ran my stack back up to 28K in 4 hours. I then tried to pick off a bluff of a guy who had raised 6 of 10 hands. I called his raise with 5-5 in the BB, and then check raised on a flop of J-7-2. He moved all in, and when I folded showed me AA. Woops. Now that I was short on chips, Meng La had no problem coming over the top whenever I raised, so my strategy changed on how to pick up chips (private thoughts sorry, but suffice it to say it mirrored the way I played on Day Five).

I found myself playing survival the rest of the day. With about one hour left in Day Two I was down to 6,500 in chips. The blinds were high (I can't recall how high but I am sure someone knows). I built my stack back up to 15K. I never showed down a hand, and lets just say the BEST hand I ever saw was AJs. With 10 minutes left in Day Two I had 15K in chips and was just happy to be alive. I was not playing any more hands. I was UTG and saw AK. Well the standard raise is maybe 1,500 or 2K. I didn't really want to get involved. I almost folded. Instead I played "the system" and just moved all in. The BB, who has had enough of my moving all in 3 hands a round, calls with AQ and I double up.

I entered Day Three with about the same chips as I entered Day Two with, but I was simply happy to be alive. I drew an interesting table. I had John Esposito (class act, very nice guy), and a bunch of aggressive Europeans. They also made it clear from the beginning that they would be coming over top of nearly all of my raises. So I had to play my Day Two strategy again.

I was so close to busting so many times but managed to hold on. I entered the dinner break on Day Three with about 15,000. I don't recall the blinds but I am sure someone can look them up. I was 14 out of the money but it was very clear I would not be able to blind my way there.

I work my way up to about 26K. The 2 other short stacks are to my left. I decide on my button I am moving in with any 2 cards because neither one of them has over 30K and probably don't want to risk missing the money by calling without AA or KK.

On my button it is folded to Ivey (on my immediate left). He makes it about 8,500 to go (standard raise). So now I fold. The SB moves in, and Ivey folds. They now break our table. As Ivey is racking his chips he looks at me and says "You should thank me I saved you whole stack."

I asked him what he said, and he said I knew what he meant. I did. How he knew I was moving in there I will probably never know. I had not even looked at my cards yet. He is truly a gifted player.

At my next table, I build up to about 35K without showing a hand. I am still 4 out of the money, and it is going to be close to being able to blind my way there (which is of course NOT my goal). Ross boatman makes it 15K to go UTG, and I pick up KK on the button. I put on a big show, which Ross says I should win an award for, and move all in. Sorry Ross, it was probably poor form on my part. He calls with 9-9 and I double up.

This is where the Hoover Dam comment comes in. The cameraman wants me to say something witty, and to be honest I am drained. I can't even think straight. He asks me what I will have to do to make the money, and I say "Time, I need time". When he asks my plan for tomorrow I mention that my wife is coming into town (planned 3 weeks ago), and she wanted to see the Hoover Dam. Well I don't really want to see the dam, I want her to see the Horseshoe!!! (Lucky lady).

Now (finally) to Day 4. I have 86K in chips, one of the shorter stacks. Money moves up VERY slowly here. I am NOT NOT NOT playing to make an extra 10K, so I decide to gamble a bit.

On about the 5th hand, I have A-Q. UTG makes it 10K to go; I raise to 30K. Julian comes over top for 70K. UTG folds. I take a LONG time. I decide that Julian could have TT or JJ and call (Well I move in for 10K more). This play was WORSE than my J-6, and only second to the J-J coming in a few minutes. He has A-K. I flop 2 pair and turn a full, and
double up. It should be noted that right after Julian turned his hand up and before the flop, I walked over to my wife and said we are going home I am done. I almost threw up right there and I was nearly to tears, I was so sick, I knew my call was awful, I knew I deserved to be busted. This is why I was so over the top when I hit my hand.

20 minutes later the JJ hand happens. Well I now had nearly 200K in chips and I had Julian covered--but mentally I assumed he still had me covered. Look this was not my finest hour of poker, there is not much more I can say. I raise in middle position when he calls on the button (perhaps one off). The flop comes T-T-x. I bet maybe 20K. He makes it 50k. I cant decide if he has a T, a big pair or he is bluffing. Want to be sure so I make it 100K. He immediately in Caro fashion shoves his chips to the middle splashing the pot it a big heap. I am now sick. If I fold I still have maybe 55K in chips (I started with 83 and believed I could still come back with this much).

I completely tilt and leave the table. I go where nobody can see me. 20 minutes ago I felt the same feeling when I thought I would get knocked out with the A-Q. Julian has me covered (in my mind not in chips), and I want to avoid that sick feeling at all costs. I put him on QQ, and I don't want to go home. I Don't want to feel that sick feeling. Not with J-J. I scream Kill it, Fold it, I am out. I say this from a good 15 feet away from the table behind the wall for cocktail waitresses. I was GONE I have NEVER been that tilted in my life. When I come back to the table they again ask what I want to do, but the dealer has now restacked Julian's chips and I only have to call about 35K. Wait he cant bust me, I will call. Matt Savage says my fold from the rail in binding. Matt made the correct ruling, and I respect him for it (as I told him 10 times afterwards).

Julian then turns up 6-6 and takes the HUGE pot.

Suffice it to say I was shaking after this hand. This was the WORST hand I have ever played. Forget the fold. I left the table and made my decision from behind a wall!!!! I got here not by having cards, but by making reads, what did I hope to read from behind the wall!!!!

My entire goal had changed from making the final table to moving up one more table at a time. I went back to playing the way I had on Days Two and Three. I picked spots and stole pots.

I don't really know how I rebounded from that. I know I called Matt Matros--he had been my unofficial coach--he told me I could rebound, but for the first time I heard the doubt in his voice. I spoke to Scott Byron, he told me to shake it off and take it as a learning
experience. My wife (who had arrived late the night before) told me I had played great and should be proud to have made it this far.

Interestingly 2 people I had never really met before motivated me. Mike Matusow walks into the room, and all I can think of was his quote after getting knocked out last year "you can be the best player in the world and NEVER get back here (to the final table." I just kept think, I may never get back to the final 45 again!!! I have to make the best of this and get back to my A game. The other player was Miami John. He asked if I had been short stacked in the WSOP before today. When I told him about my other days, he said I must be like him (better short stacked), and told me to do whatever I did then.

The rest of the story has been told--but now to Day Five again. I was still in the mindset of being shortstacked on days Two, Three, and Four. I never changed gears to where they needed to be. The J-6 was the symptom not the problem.

Again, thanks to all for their support, I hope to bring this thing home in the future (hell, I have a 15 year free roll now!!!!)
-Russell Rosenblum, Esq.

Thank you, Russell, for sharing this intensely personal and able analytical report, and congratulations on a finish that no doubt feels bittersweet right but which eventually you will see for the great accomplishment it was. You obviously have the heart of a champion. Whether you choose to pursue this path, or focus your energy on other people or pursuits, we don't know, but I think you could succeed in the poker world if you wanted to. I also believe that most of the small group capable of making it as poker professionals (and it is a smaller group than most think) are capable of giving the world more than their poker play.
-Andrew N.S. Glazer

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